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CORBETT, CLAUSEWITZ, AND SUN TZU
Michael I. Handel
Even the most creative theories in history were not conceived in a vacuum;one way or another, they owe something to the works of others. To describe
this intellectual and intuitive process, historian of science I. B. Cohen has devel-
oped a concept called “the transformation of ideas,” which reveals how great sci-
entists have used the existing body of knowledge as a basis of or catalyst for their
own inspiration.1 Scientists such as Isaac Newton and Charles Darwin, for ex-
ample, either synthesized and combined the work of others, while adding their
own ideas, or were heuristically stimulated by existing ideas to develop their
own original concepts. The same is true of those whose creative and analytical
thought processes have “transformed” the intricacies of strategy—in this case,
naval strategy—into an innovative theory or body of work. It is well known that
Alfred Thayer Mahan, as he himself made clear, was significantly influenced by
Baron de Jomini’s work and that Sir Julian Corbett was equally influenced by
Clausewitz’s On War.2
My argument is that while Mahan integrates and synthesizes Jomini’s work
with his own, Corbett uses Clausewitz’s On War as a heuristic point of depar-
ture. Mahan, in other words, remains loyal to Jomini’s ideas, and by extension,
those of the “continental strategists.” In contrast, Corbett, although inspired by
On War, develops ideas different from and sometimes contradictory to those of
Clausewitz. The subtle approach adopted by Corbett ironically resembles that of
a work he had never read—Sun Tzu’s The Art of War.3 In view of the limited space
available, I will focus on two of Corbett’s most original ideas, which also provide
excellent illustrations of the differences between naval and land-based warfare:
namely, his positions on “the concentration of force” and “limited war.”
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Let me first, however, say a few words on what Corbett and Clausewitz do
have in common. To begin with, Clausewitz and Corbett share a belief in the pri-
macy of politics in war and in devising an appropriate strategy to protect the na-
tional interests. Clearly, Corbett independently understood the importance of
the primacy of politics before reading On War in 1904, but Clausewitz’s ideas did
help him to clarify this idea. Corbett also believes in studying and developing the
theory of war for educational purposes. His debt to Clausewitz on this score is
made clear in his chapter on “The Theoretical Study of War—Its Use and Limita-
tions” (Some Principles, pp. 3–11). Herein he adds that such study will establish a
“common vehicle of expression and a common plane of thought . . . for the sake
of mental solidarity between a chief and his subordinates”(Some Principles, pp.8,5).
Corbett also agrees with Clausewitz that since even the best theory of war is
“not . . . a substitute for judgment and experience,” it cannot “systematize” strat-
egy into an exact science (Some Principles, p. 10). At best, theory can ascertain
what is “normal”—but war, with its reciprocal, uncertain, and complex nature,
is dominated by deviations from the norm (Some Principles, pp. 8–9). Friction,
chance, and luck must never be discounted as well.4 Corbett therefore resembles
Clausewitz in his repeated emphasis on the importance of understanding both
the value and inherent limitations of a theory of war.
“Strategical analysis can never give exact results. It aims only at approxima-
tions, at groupings which will serve to guide but will always leave much to the
judgment” (Some Principles, pp. 83–4). With the constantly changing nature of
war (more so in Corbett’s time, because of the accelerated development of new
technologies and weapons at sea), the first question that either man would ask is,
What is the nature of this war?5 Much more could be said about the similarities
between the two, but let me now turn to a discussion of their differences.
Corbett’s most glaring criticism of Clausewitz, the continental strategists (for
instance, Jomini), and most British naval strategists of his time concerns their
“big-battle fixation.”6 Most of Corbett’s contemporaries were content to accept
this crude and highly selective version of Clausewitz’s ideas, because it conve-
niently supported their own beliefs.7 This was a major component of the Napo-
leonic style of war, which consisted of a “strenuous and persistent effort—not
resting to secure each minor advantage, but pressing the enemy without pause
or rest till he is utterly overthrown.”8 (Corbett believes that the origin of what he
terms Clausewitz’s fetish for the decisive battle could be traced back to Oliver
Cromwell [Some Principles, pp. 22, 157, 176].) The search for the decisive battle
is closely related to Clausewitz’s principle of destruction and achievement of
victory through the greatest possible concentration of forces at the decisive
point. Clausewitz presents the idea thus:
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Combat is the only effective force in war; its aim is to destroy the enemy’s forces as a
means to a further end. . . . It follows that the destruction of the enemy’s forces un-
derlies all military actions; all plans are ultimately based on it, resting on it like an
arch on its abutment. . . . The decision by arms is for all major and minor operations
in war what cash payment is in commerce. . . . Thus it is evident that destruction of
the enemy forces is always the superior, more effective means, with which others can-
not compete (On War, 1.2, p. 97).
We do claim that the direct annihilation of the enemy’s forces must always be the
dominant consideration. We simply want to establish this dominance of the destruc-
tive principle (On War, 4.3, p. 228).
The maximum concentration of forces was indeed the key to winning the de-
cisive battle and overthrowing the enemy: Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Jomini, and all
of the other continental thinkers would agree that this is the most important
principle of war. Clausewitz puts it this way: “As many troops as possible should
be brought into the engagement at the decisive point. . . . This is the first princi-
ple of strategy” (On War, 3.8, p. 195); also, “The best strategy is always to be very
strong; first in general, and then at the decisive point. . . . There is no higher and
simpler law of strategy than that of keeping one’s forces concentrated” (On War,
3.11, p. 204).
Corbett does not believe that the concentration of naval forces at sea is the
highest and simplest law of strategy. On the contrary, he observes that the prin-
ciple of concentration has become “a kind of shibboleth” that has done more
harm than good (Some Principles, p. 134). The principle of concentration is “a
truism—no one would dispute it. As a canon of practical strategy, it is untrue”
(Some Principles, p. 160).
The crude maxims as to primary objects which seem to have served well enough in
continental warfare have never worked so clearly where the sea enters seriously into a
war. In such cases, it will not suffice to say that the primary object of the army is to
destroy the enemy’s army, or that of the fleet to destroy the enemy’s fleet. The deli-
cate interactions of the land and sea factors produce conditions too intricate for such
blunt solutions. Even the initial equations they present are too complex to be re-
duced by the simple application of rough-and-ready maxims (Some Principles, p. 16).
In view of his strongly held opinions, it is not surprising that Corbett expends
much effort to prove his point. Indeed, his refutation of the principle of concen-
tration at sea produces some of his most creative and original ideas in Some
Principles of Maritime Strategy. Furthermore, the process of developing these
original ideas embroiled Corbett in a vitriolic debate with some of the leading
military theorists and naval experts of his time. This most assuredly did nothing
to enhance his reputation, since the subtlety of his ideas destined them to be
H A N D E L 1 0 9
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misunderstood. For example, Lord Sydenham later accused him of exerting a
negative influence on the doctrine, plans, and morale of the British navy, thereby
contributing to their failure to achieve decisive results in the battle of Jutland.9
Many years later, Cyril Falls charged Corbett with “minimizing the importance
of combat.”10 Despite a barrage of criticism, Corbett steadfastly refused to
change his strategically “blasphemous” conclusions.
Corbett’s first argument was that superior concentration at sea cannot neces-
sarily force a major engagement, because it is easier for the enemy’s fleet to avoid
battle at sea than it is for an army to do so on land. Paradoxically, the greater the
concentration achieved by one’s
own fleet, the more likely the weaker
opponent is to avoid battle. Only
through dispersing, or rather pre-
tending to disperse, its fleet can the
stronger navy lure the enemy into
battle: “If we are too superior, or our
concentration too well arranged for him to hope for victory, then our concentra-
tion has almost always had the effect of forcing him to disperse for sporadic ac-
tion” (Some Principles, p. 138).
Paradoxically, therefore, only less concentration (or the appearance thereof)
will lead to a major battle.11 Moreover, concentration at sea is problematic for
other reasons as well. The more a navy concentrates, the fewer the sea lanes of
communications and the less space it can secure and control. “Concentration, in
fact,” Corbett notes, “implies a continual conflict between cohesion and reach”
(Some Principles, p. 132). A corollary of this point is Corbett’s argument that
complete or full concentration at sea is impossible, because from the very begin-
ning of the conflict, a substantial number of ships must be diverted for protec-
tion of such vulnerable interests as overseas trade and other resources. “The
more you concentrate your force and efforts to secure the desired decision, the
more you will expose your trade to sporadic attack” (Some Principles, p. 160; also
pp. 128–52, 155–61). Superior concentration thus not only deters the weaker
opponent from seeking battle but presents him with an opportunity to attack his
enemy’s exposed national lines of communication.
Superior concentration of naval forces creates yet another serious problem.
The greater the concentration of a fleet, the more difficult it is to conceal its
whereabouts and movements. “Once the mass is formed, concealment and flexi-
bility are at an end” (Some Principles, pp. 131, 138). Here Corbett is making an
additional argument, much like Sun Tzu’s, for the need to keep one’s own dispo-
sitions “shapeless” in order to avoid disclosing one’s intentions. Sun Tzu states:
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The ultimate in disposing one’s troops is to be without ascertainable shape. Then the
most penetrating spies cannot pry in nor can the wise lay plans against you. It is ac-
cording to the shapes that I lay plans for victory, but the multitude does not compre-
hend this. Although everyone can see the outward aspects, none understands the way
in which I have created victory (The Art of War, p. 100).
Corbett also believes that calculated dispersion and “shapelessness” create
unexpected combinations and surprises that bring victory. “War has proved to
the hilt that victories have not only to be won, but worked for. They must be
worked for by bold strategical combinations, which as a rule entail at least ap-
parent dispersal. They can only be achieved by taking risks, and the greatest and
most effective of these is division” (Some Principles, p. 134). Elsewhere, he fur-
ther emphasizes the same point:
The next principle is flexibility. Concentration should be so arranged that any two
parts may freely cohere, and that all parts may quickly condense into a mass at any
point in the area of concentration. The object of holding back from forming the mass
is to deny the enemy knowledge of our actual distribution or its intention at any
given moment, and at the same time to ensure that it will be adjusted to meet any
dangerous movement that is open to him. Further than this our aim should be not
merely to prevent any part being overpowered by a superior force, but to regard ev-
ery detached squadron as a trap to lure the enemy to destruction. The ideal concen-
tration, in short, is an appearance of weakness that covers a reality of strength (Some
Principles, p. 152; also p. 206).
Unlike Clausewitz but very much like Sun Tzu, Corbett underscores the rele-
vance of deception in the achievement of concentration at the decisive point.
For Corbett, concentration is not simply amassing the largest number of ships,
as Mahan or Clausewitz would advocate; instead, it means manipulating the en-
emy’s perceptions so that he will fight on his (Corbett’s) terms. Sun Tzu de-
scribes it thus: “Those skilled at making the enemy move do so by creating a
situation to which he must conform. They entice him with something he is certain
to take, and with lures of ostensible profit they wait for him in strength”(The Art of
War, p. 93).
Consequently, Sun Tzu’s approach can be described as negative, in the sense
that he considers the division and distraction of the enemy to be more impor-
tant than maximizing the concentration of his own forces.12
At this juncture, some other notable similarities between Corbett and Sun
Tzu should be mentioned. Corbett develops his theoretical insights against a
broad background; in other words, he is interested in the diplomatic alliance
systems and coalitions formed before and during a war, and he is concerned with
the economic and financial dimensions of waging war as well as with the techno-
logical and material aspects of war, which were of no interest to Clausewitz.
H A N D E L 1 1 1
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(Clausewitz wrote On War before the industrial revolution, which triggered an
ever-accelerating rate of technological changes.)13 Corbett also agrees with Sun
Tzu that the intelligent strategist must fight only on his own preferred terms and
exploit his comparative advantage. As Sun Tzu puts it, “Therefore the clever
combatant imposes his will on the enemy but does not allow the enemy’s will to
be imposed on him” (The Art of War, p. 42); “And therefore those skilled in war
bring the enemy to the field of battle, and are not brought by him” (The Art of
War, p. 96).
Corbett’s preference for a limited war of a particular type in a particular
place, and his preference for the strategic (though not operational and tactical)
levels are all part of his search for the comparative advantage of Britain—or that
of any other nation in similar circumstances. This is a critical part of all strategic
planning, which Sun Tzu and Corbett emphasize but Clausewitz seems to ig-
nore. Perhaps the search for a comparative advantage is only valued by the weak,
or by naval powers obliged, with limited resources, to protect a vast empire or
fight a formidable land power.
Another important approach shared by Corbett and Sun Tzu is their desire to
win at the lowest possible cost. Since this entails taking minimum risks for maxi-
mum gains, their theories are dominated by the constant search for low-cost vic-
tories and force multipliers. The principal lesson Corbett drew from Britain’s
strategy in the Mediterranean during the War of Spanish Succession was that it
revealed “how an intelligent, if limited, appreciation of sea power to a tender
diplomatic situation could produce results out of all proportion to its real physi-
cal potential.”14 He learned a similar lesson from the British naval war against
Napoleon, wherein thirty thousand soldiers at the Downs forced Napoleon to tie
down three hundred thousand men from the National Guards to defend the
French coast (Some Principles, p. 69). Elsewhere, Corbett points out that the ef-
fect of British amphibious threats to use small contingent forces to invade the
continent or to divert enemy forces to the coast “was always out of all proportion
to the intrinsic strength employed or the positive results it could give. . . . Its
value lay in its power of containing [a] force greater than its own” (Some Princi-
ples, p. 67).
Convinced that an economy of force was a dangerously false economy,
Clausewitz instead preferred to focus on the effectiveness of force—that is, on the
outcome, not the cost. “Since in war,” he says, “too small an effort can result not
just in failure but in positive harm, each side is driven to outdo the other” (On
War, p. 585). Clausewitz’s conception of a true economy of force was not (as Sun
Tzu, Corbett, or modern compilations of the principles of war would argue) to win
at the lowest possible cost but rather to make use of all available forces regardless of
the cost (On War, p. 213). Corbett and Sun Tzu also share a belief in the indirect
1 1 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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approach, which relates to the search for comparative advantage, economy of
force, surprise and deception, and limited war. (Unfortunately, a detailed com-
parison of Corbett, the British style of warfare, and Sun Tzu cannot be at-
tempted here.)
Unlike Clausewitz, Jomini, and the other continental strategists, Corbett was
not infatuated with the search for the decisive battle or with the need for the
strategic offensive. In general, he favored the strategic defensive, with an empha-
sis on the offense at the operational level. As a result, his detractors mistakenly
thought that his comments pertaining to the strategic level of war were referring
to the lower levels. Corbett’s strategy is based on rational, unsentimental calcu-
lations, not on vaguely romantic obsessions with the brilliance of Napoleon or
Nelson. Again, like Sun Tzu, Corbett was generally opposed to taking unneces-
sary risks in war, whereas Clausewitz
believed that the military genius, led
by his intuition, must be defined by
his readiness to take significant risks.
“Boldness in war . . . has its own pre-
rogatives. It must be granted a cer-
tain power over and above successful
calculations. . . . In other words, it is a
genuinely creative force. . . . A distin-
guished commander without boldness is unthinkable” (On War, pp. 190–2).
Corbett certainly values boldness as an essential leadership quality, but he con-
cludes that careful calculations and strategic creativity should govern all actions.
Since the bravado and daring inherent in bold action naturally held greater
appeal for most of Corbett’s critics, his sagacious observations on the strategic
advantages of the defense were interpreted as signs of passivity and poor fight-
ing spirit.15 Upon closer examination, Corbett’s strategic defensive is found to
employ such measures as an intense local offensive, the projection of land forces,
various types of blockades, and raids on enemy trade routes. Moreover, Corbett
recognizes that once the enemy has been sufficiently weakened on sea and on
land, the shift to the strategic offensive should not be delayed. Yet the cult of the
offensive so dominated the thinking of his contemporaries that the essence of
Corbett’s outwardly controversial message was not really heard. As a strategist,
Corbett is more concerned with the question of how to obtain certain objectives
than he is with the form of a particular war.
According to Corbett, naval strategists must accept the fact that war at sea is
not usually a zero-sum game, since it is rarely possible to achieve full command
of the sea.
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[It is erroneous to assume] that if one belligerent loses the command of the sea it passes
at once to the other belligerent. . . . The most common situation in naval war is that
neither side has the command; that the normal position is not a commanded sea, but
an uncommanded sea. . . . The command is normally in dispute. It is this state of dis-
pute with which naval strategy is most nearly concerned (Some Principles, p. 91).
Consequently, Corbett was not unduly concerned about this issue, probably
because he was confident that the Royal Navy would gain command of the sea
soon enough. This “relaxed” attitude certainly clashes with Clausewitz’s concept
of war as the aggressive application of force to end disputes as soon as possible.
For Clausewitz, clarity is the objective, decisive action the means; the very idea
of tolerating an ongoing dispute or a “shared sea” would be repugnant. As one
who also sought the clarity of a decisive battle, Mahan shared Clausewitz’s impa-
tience with such ambiguity.
Yet is achieving the desired concentration and winning the decisive battle
worth the cost? Clausewitz, Jomini, Mahan, and the continental strategists
would all reply in the affirmative. Inflicting a decisive defeat allows the victor to
“compel [the] enemy to do [the victor’s] will.” Clausewitz’s own view is not,
however, simplistic: he knows that even the most decisive victory is only a neces-
sary, not a sufficient, condition for accomplishing the winning state’s long-run
objectives. “In war,” he warns, “the result is never final” (On War, p. 80). By this
he means that the military gains secured in battle will not last unless political
leaders and diplomats offer the vanquished side peace terms that are acceptable
in the long run, and also make a concerted effort to establish common interests
between the former foes.
The search for a decisive victory does not, however, have the same allure for
Corbett. As a naval strategist, he believes that since “men live upon the land and
not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war have always been de-
cided—except in the rarest cases—either by what your army can do against your
enemy’s territory and national life, or else by the fear of what the fleet makes it
possible for your army to do” (Some Principles, p. 16). In short, a decisive victory
at sea is so rare that it is not normally worth the effort. At a time when all other
naval strategists agreed that Nelson’s victory at Trafalgar had been exemplary,
Corbett reasoned that such adulation was undeserved. After all, he points out,
the strategic results of the great sea victory had been indecisive as far as the war
against Napoleon on the continent had been concerned, and Nelson may have
taken too great a tactical risk.
Trafalgar is ranked as one of the decisive battles of the world, and yet of all the great
victories, there is not one which to all appearance was so barren of immediate result.
. . . It gave England finally the dominion of the seas, but it left Napoleon dictator of
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the continent. So incomprehensible was its apparent sterility that to fill the void a
legend grew up that it saved England from invasion.16
Clearly, Corbett was not trying to enhance his popularity as a naval strategist
when he wrote these words, however objectively sensible, of national and naval
“heresy.” For Corbett, then, an “open” or “closed” blockade; the threat of a “fleet
in being”; and the naval support of land operations by transporting, supplying,
and landing army troops in combined operations were the “bread and butter” of
naval operations and the essence of naval strength. As mentioned earlier, his
stubborn adherence to this unpopular position in his work as well as in his lec-
tures at the Royal Naval War College, Greenwich, later sparked accusations that
his strategic theory underlay the failure of the battle of Jutland. Surely Corbett
thought that Jutland was unnecessary, that without a decisive victory it simply
confirmed British naval superiority and put the German High Seas Fleet out of
the picture for the remainder of the war. However, even a decisive British victory
in the battle, as in the case of Trafalgar, was unlikely to have had more than a neg-
ligible impact on the land war.
* * * * * * *
Corbett’s development of the concept of limited war provides us with another
good example of his creative contribution to strategic theory in general and na-
val strategy in particular. The theory of war expounded by Corbett has little in
common with its heuristic starting point, namely, Clausewitz’s concept of lim-
ited war as set forth in On War. Corbett’s new concept of limited war also enables
us to see how the naval perspective could breathe fresh insight into a strategy
that had been ignored or misunderstood by the continental strategists.
First, a brief word on Clausewitz’s concept of limited war is in place. For most
of his intellectual life, Clausewitz was chiefly interested in the study of total, or
absolute, war. This reflected his personal as well as the Prussian experience with
the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon. His ideal type of war was in-
deed unlimited in scope; any lesser effort meant lost effectiveness in proportion
to its deviation from the inherent, true nature of war. With the defeat of Napo-
leon, the restoration of the European balance of power, and the development of
Prussia’s strategic problems, however, Clausewitz gradually recognized the exis-
tence of a type of limited war that was, in reality, much more common than total
war.17 In this type of limited war, the enemy’s army was no longer the center of
gravity, and the optimal strategy was not a search for the decisive battle.
Clausewitz’s discovery of the prevalence of limited war in turn led to the evo-
lution of his concept of the primacy of politics. The absolute or total war has, in
theory, its own logic and momentum, which is in reality subject to the con-
straints imposed by the political interests of the state. Vital interests call for an
H A N D E L 1 1 5
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unlimited war effort, while secondary interests justify no more than a limited in-
vestment of resources and effort. Thus, the importance of the belligerents’ stakes
in a war as defined by their political leaders, as well as their reciprocal interac-
tion, determines whether the war remains limited in scope.
A second reason to limit the effort expended in war concerns the relative
strength and means available to the belligerents. Nevertheless, if insufficient re-
sources or strength were the only reasons for limiting a war effort, the “opera-
tional theory of war” or other nonpolitical factors would be enough to
determine whether a war should be limited or expanded. Clausewitz’s explica-
tion of the theory of limited war and the primacy of politics provides the crucial
missing dimension for such determinations. Even if he had not made this “dis-
covery,” Clausewitz might still have begun to appreciate the prevalence of lim-
ited war, by viewing it as a function of insufficient means to wage all-out war.
Nevertheless, his later recognition of limited war was based primarily on politi-
cal considerations. In a truly limited war as defined by the political authorities,
weak motivation to fight is enough to fetter the war effort of an otherwise stron-
ger state. Thus, the degree to which a war will be limited is, in the end, deter-
mined by political and military considerations of relative strength.18
Clausewitz also distinguishes between defensive and offensive limited wars.
Limited war normally occurs when the defending side has no incentive to go to
war or when a weaker side is attacked by the stronger one. In such instances, the
defense allows the passive or weaker side to wage war at the lowest possible cost
while stalling until the opponent gives up, allies come to assist, or the defender
can move over to the attack.
If a state’s objectives are confined to the acquisition of a relatively small
amount of territory, for annexation or bargaining purposes, it pursues a corre-
spondingly limited war. At times a limited offensive can take a preemptive form,
in order to forestall an enemy attack or secure a better forward defensive posi-
tion. Clausewitz also concludes that limited offensives strengthen the attacker if
the territory thereby acquired is adjacent to its own—but they can actually
weaken the attacker if the same territory is noncontiguous. In addition,
Clausewitz argues that if an offensive leaves the attacker’s own territory vulnera-
ble to a counterattack, the would-be attacker is better off preserving territorial
integrity than acquiring territory of marginal value.
Another special type of limited war identified by Clausewitz drew Corbett’s
interest as well: a situation in which one state assists another in making a limited
contribution to a common cause. This involves sending
a moderately-sized force [to] . . . help; but if things go wrong, the operation is pretty
well written off, and one tries to withdraw at the smallest possible cost. It is
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traditional . . . for states to make offensive and defensive pacts for mutual sup-
port—though not to the point of fully espousing one another’s interests and quar-
rels. Regardless of the purpose of the war or the scale of the enemy’s exertions, they
pledge each other in advance to contribute a fixed and usually modest force. . . . It
would all be tidier . . . if the contingent promised . . . were placed entirely at the ally’s
disposal and he were free to use it as he wished. It would then in effect be a hired
force. But that is far from what really happens. The auxiliary force usually operates
under its own commander; he is dependent only on his own government, and the
objective the latter sets him will be as ambiguous as its aims. . . . The affair is more of-
ten like a business deal. In the light of the risks he expects and dividend he hopes for,
each will invest about 30,000 to 40,000 men and behave as if that were all he stood to
lose. . . . Even when both share a major interest, action is clogged with diplomatic reser-
vations, and as a rule the negotiators only pledge a small and limited contingent (On
War, p. 603).19
After summarizing Clausewitz’s (and Jomini’s) discussion of limited war
(Some Principles, pp. 41–51), Corbett asserts that Clausewitz “never appre-
hended the full significance of his [own] brilliant theory. His outlook was still
purely continental, and the limitations of continental warfare tend to veil the
fuller meaning of the principle he had framed.” Corbett then suggests that since
Clausewitz’s death had doomed his
theory to a perpetually unfinished
state, he (Corbett) would adapt
Clausewitz’s theory of limited war
“to modern imperial conditions, and
above all where the maritime ele-
ment forcibly asserts itself . . . with its far-reaching effects for a maritime and
above all an insular Power” (Some Principles, p. 52). In the process of brilliantly
adapting Clausewitz’s theory to the unique circumstances of naval warfare, par-
ticularly to the needs of British strategy, Corbett actually developed his own in-
novative theory of limited war in maritime strategy.
Corbett undoubtedly intuitively understood the nature of this subject from
his own historical research, but Clausewitz provided him with, first, the ideal ex-
pression, “limited war,” and, second, the conceptual framework for a nascent
theory that did not emphasize all-out war in search of a decisive battle. This gave
Corbett the impetus to make the transition from the “higher,” continental, un-
limited form of strategy to its “lower,” maritime, limited form. Corbett’s origi-
nal—not derivative—theory not only transcends that of Clausewitz but also
adds an important new dimension to naval strategy. While Corbett was con-
vinced that death alone had kept Clausewitz from eventually reaching the same
conclusions, it is unlikely that Clausewitz would have progressed along these
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lines without direct experience in maritime warfare or familiarity with naval or
imperial history (see endnote 18). Corbett himself mentions that although Jomini
wrote a chapter on “On Great Invasions and Distant Expeditions,” his “entirely
continental thought had failed to penetrate the subject”(Some Principles, p. 56).20
From his naval and broader imperial perspective, Corbett found Clausewitz’s
theory of limited war marred by its narrow, continental focus (Some Principles,
p. 54). He therefore began to construct his own ideal paradigm of limited war, at
first by exposing the weaknesses of Clausewitz’s argument. The first of his two
main points is that in wartime conditions on the continent, as opposed to those
in the maritime and imperial environment, wars were fought mostly between
adjacent states. This, in Corbett’s opinion, made escalation almost inevitable.
“Such territory is usually an organic part of your enemy’s country, or otherwise
of so much importance to him that he will be willing to use unlimited effort to
retain it” (Some Principles, p. 54). This critique holds true as far as it goes, but
Clausewitz cannot be accused of neglecting the question of escalation; in fact, he
was acutely aware of the inherent tendency of war to escalate.21 Corbett’s second
point is that in wars between contiguous continental states “there will be no
strategical obstacle to his [the enemy’s] being able to use his whole force” (Some
Principles, pp. 54–5). In other words, the nature of continental war makes it dif-
ficult to limit political aims, because one or both states are able to use all of the
means at their disposal to protect the inevitably threatened vital interests. A na-
tion fights a maritime and imperial war not on contiguous territory but overseas
or in remote, peripheral areas that do not threaten the other belligerent’s vital
interests. Thus, escalation in this environment is not unavoidable, because the
opponent can limit his political aims or escalate according to his own discretion.
Another crucial difference between continental and maritime warfare is that
in the maritime environment, the dominant naval power can isolate the theater
of war to prevent the introduction of enemy reinforcements as well as secure its
home defense. As Corbett demonstrates, this means that the conditions for the
ideal limited war exist only in maritime warfare and can only be exploited by the
preponderant naval power: “Limited war is only permanently possible to island
Powers or between Powers which are separated by sea, and then only when the
Power desiring limited war is able to command the sea to such a degree as to be
able not only to isolate the distant object, but also to render impossible the inva-
sion of his home territory” (Some Principles, p. 57).
As long as its navy is strong enough to protect its home from invasion, an is-
land naval power enjoys a unique advantage that Sun Tzu would have appreci-
ated.22 From this invulnerable position such a navy can, at its own discretion,
project its limited land power while preventing the enemy from doing the same.
Even if a naval power is weaker in absolute terms, it can not only hold its own but
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also use its power overseas to compete with more powerful land powers. This, in
Corbett’s estimation, was the secret of British power; it explained how “a small
country with a weak army should have been able to gather to herself the most de-
sirable regions of the earth, and to gather them at the expense of the greatest mil-
itary Powers. . . . It remained for Clausewitz, unknown to himself, to discover
that explanation, and he reveals it to us in the inherent strength of limited war”
(Some Principles, pp. 58–9).
In reality, Clausewitz’s theory cannot claim credit for this explanation of the
expansion of British power. This can be attributed solely to Corbett’s own devel-
opment of a new form of limited war in the unique maritime environment.
Clausewitz’s theory describes a defensive limited war necessitated by a state’s
limited ambitions or weakness, while Corbett’s demonstrates how limited
strength, coupled with a suitable strategy and a particular set of circumstances,
can be used to expand the power of the state. For Clausewitz, as we know, the de-
cision to wage a limited war was first and foremost a political one (which can
also depend on the availability of means). Corbett takes his theory of the
ideal-type maritime limited war one step farther, as a new method of war. In do-
ing so, he moves away from political considerations and concentrates on the
most effective use of limited means, by grafting his own ideal type of the true
limited war onto Clausewitz’s concept of “war by limited contingency” (On War,
p. 603). The result is an integrated theory of combined naval and land opera-
tions, one that allows a small but effective naval power (under the ideal condi-
tions described above) to maximize the effectiveness of the limited means at its
disposal. The success of such a “war by limited contingency” hinges upon “the
intimacy with which naval and military action can be combined to give the con-
tingent a weight and mobility that are beyond its intrinsic power” (Some Princi-
ples, pp. 62–3). This is a case where the result achieved is truly more than the sum
of its parts.
Another advantage of “war by limited contingency,” in which one deploys a
“disposal force,” is that even if all fails, the possible gains outweigh the risks en-
tailed (Some Principles, p. 69). When availing itself of this method, a state has the
choice of fighting with either limited or unlimited means. Indeed, in the Penin-
sular War, which provided the perfect conditions for a “war by limited contin-
gency,” Britain had applied “the limited form to an unlimited war. Our object
was unlimited. It was nothing less than the overthrow of Napoleon. Complete
success at sea had failed to do it, but that success had given us the power of apply-
ing the limited form, which was the most decisive form of offence within our
means” (Some Principles, p. 65). While the continental version of “war by limited
contingency” invariably escalates into an unlimited form, the maritime (British)
version can remain limited (Some Principles, p. 66).
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Obtaining “unlimited” results with limited force—the type of force multi-
plier found in Corbett’s paradigm of the ideal limited war—can of course be
identified with the theory of Sun Tzu, who says, “Thus the potential of troops
skillfully commanded in battle may be compared to that of round boulders
which roll down from the mountain heights.” According to the commentators
Chang Yu and Tu Mu, this means that “the force applied is minute but the results
are enormous,” and “one needs . . . but little strength to achieve much” (The Art
of War, p. 95).
Thus, Corbett ultimately devised a particular method of using maritime
power that Clausewitz could not have considered. This method is admittedly
relevant for only a small number of naval powers, but those to whom it applies
can parlay their limited resources into the attainment of ambitious political ob-
jectives without risking escalation or defeat (Some Principles, p. 77). Corbett lik-
ens this aspect of his concept to the advantages enjoyed by the defense, which
“sometimes enable an inferior force to gain its end against a superior one.” The
drawbacks of the defense do not, however, apply here. Limited war allows the na-
val power to maintain the initiative both on the strategic and tactical levels, de-
pending on the circumstances. Under the favorable conditions of Corbett’s ideal
limited war, the naval power can assume an offensive posture almost immedi-
ately (on the tactical or strategic levels) without exposing itself to unacceptable
risks. This type of transition would take much longer to accomplish in continen-
tal warfare. Corbett then concludes that “the limited form of war has this ele-
ment of strength over and above the unlimited form. . . . The point is of the
highest importance, for it is a direct negation of the current doctrine that in war
there can be but one legitimate object, the overthrow of the enemy’s means of re-
sistance, and that the primary objective must always be his armed forces” (Some
Principles, p. 74).
Having thus aroused the suspicion of his contemporaries with his praise of
limited war and with the implied passivity of equating it with the defense,
Corbett makes a painfully obvious attempt to reassure his readers. To the state-
ment that all forms of war “demand the use of battles” he adds that achieving fa-
vorable circumstances for the ideal limited war depends first on the overthrow
of the enemy’s naval forces (Some Principles, pp. 86–7). Corbett’s theory is also
the answer to the chimerical search for the decisive battle, in that he uses the
“lower means” of war to secure the positive results necessary for an eventual
move to the “higher form” if necessary.
* * * * * * *
In The Development of Military Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Azar Gat de-
scribes Some Principles of Maritime Strategy as “an etude on Clausewitz.”23 This
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statement entirely underestimates Corbett’s originality and contribution to
strategic theory. Clausewitz’s On War was an invaluable basis and stimulus for
Corbett’s theoretical work—but not its blueprint. For example, Corbett did not
hesitate to take issue with Clausewitz on the importance of the search for the de-
cisive battle and the principle of concentration. The fact that Corbett believed
these factors to be far less relevant at sea was a daring departure from the ac-
cepted wisdom of his time. In developing his theory of limited war, Corbett
again used On War as his point of departure but ended up with his own, unique
method of waging a limited war in a maritime environment. By inclination and
through the influence of the British style of warfare, Corbett has more in com-
mon with Sun Tzu than with Clausewitz.
As a counter-factual, we might ask whether Clausewitz would have made any
changes in On War had he read Corbett’s principles of naval strategy. The an-
swer, I believe, is a qualified yes. It would have apprised him of the contribution
of naval power to continental warfare, perhaps inspiring him to add a chapter on
the “pure” maritime limited war and some exceptions to the principle of con-
centration in naval war. Moreover, it might have provided him with some incen-
tive to discuss the economic and financial aspects of war, including economic
blockade, as part of attrition warfare.
While Mahan’s theory is a good example of the theory of war at sea as influ-
enced by the classical theory of land warfare, Corbett’s theory arrives at some
original insights that contradict the conventional wisdom of the continental
strategists. Is Corbett’s work as important or original as that of Clausewitz?
Clearly not. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy is more repetitive and paro-
chial than On War, and it focuses on the narrower aspects of British maritime
strategy. I cannot judge Corbett’s place among naval historians, but I believe that
he belongs at the top of the second tier in the pantheon of classical strategic
theorists.
* * * * * * *
As an afterthought, it is interesting to note that in the age of modern airpower,
Corbett’s theory of limited war can acquire a degree of relevance perhaps ex-
ceeding that which its author envisioned. Today, the sustained projection of
airpower, combined with the use of precision guided munitions, presents condi-
tions that fit Corbett’s requirements: namely, a remote overseas battlefield that
can be isolated by naval superiority and that allows the projection, insertion,
and removal of land forces at will. The sustained command of the air—together
with day and night fighting capabilities and long-range, precision fire-
power—can create the isolation necessary for a limited war in any region of the
world. This scenario would, however, require complete air superiority as well as
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the continuous projection of airpower for a prolonged period of time. The pro-
jection of land power would, in this case, be supported by air or naval power (in-
stead of by naval power alone). Modern airpower can extend its reach beyond
that of the old naval power concept, because it depends far less on uniquely ad-
vantageous geographic conditions. The isolation of a chosen battlefield could be
achieved artificially by precision fire from the air. Such use of airpower could
work in a conventional war (as in Korea, for example), but not in guerrilla-type
warfare. Such isolation of the battlefield was almost achieved in the Korean War,
although airpower could not then be used both by day and night, nor was
long-range, precision guided firepower available.
Although such a strategy could not work in the Vietnam War, because of the
nature of guerrilla warfare, it performed quite well in the milieu of the Gulf War.
Current and future military technologies will therefore, under ideal conditions,
be able to isolate artificially a battlefield for implementation of Corbett’s “lim-
ited contingency war” concept.
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